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Abstract
There is an ever-present danger that a private association may evolve into an enterprise with an elitist structure that
extensively exploits its powers. While it is well known that the key role in limiting the excessive powers of state elites
belongs to civil society, the question of policing the elites of monopolistic private orders is understudied. We use the case
of the Fe´de´ration Internationale de Football Association’s (FIFA) private order to illustrate how private orders evolve under
constraints imposed by public orders. Although private ordering has advantages compared to public ordering, much of the
credit for the success of FIFA’s private order goes to the state. Regulatory privileges granted to FIFA, and the refusal to
intervene widely in FIFA’s affairs, have made private ordering possible in the first place. The challenge is, however, that
private association capture by powerful interest groups can easily limit advantages of private ordering. In this situation, the
proper role of the state is to act in the role of civil society by employing strategic interventions to help the private order deal
with its governance failures without endangering the private order’s existence. Accordingly, when the power within a
monopolistic private membership association becomes heavily imbalanced, it invites the state to intervene in an attempt to
restore the lost balance. However, opening the door to the state—as in the case of so-called FIFA-gate—increases the
danger that other and greater interventions will undermine the existence of the private order and remove its advantages.
Keywords Private ordering  Public–private governance  Organizational behavior  Civil society  Corruption 
FIFA  Football
1 Introduction
States and supra-national organizations, like the European
Union (EU), have always been considered as the primary
candidates for building and maintaining institutional
infrastructure that supports economic activity. They do this
by dealing with undesirable monopoly, market power, and
other market failures that plague the competitive trade of
commodities and services. As a result, the traditional
answer to these problems has always been that ‘‘there
ought to be state regulation’’. Nevertheless, numerous
private modes of governance—such as business, sport, and
other member associations—provide institutional support
for economic activity. Business and economic globaliza-
tion, coupled with the rise of the freedom of contract and
private dispute resolution bodies, has inevitably increased
the role of private ordering.1
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Indeed, private associations often step into the shoes of
regulators and to offer institutional support with advan-
tages that public ordering often lacks.2 Consider, for
example, the private association’s expertise, flexibility in
decision-making and better knowledge of the involved
actors. The superiority of these aspects of private associ-
ations results in institutions that are better suited to the
needs of the involved actors. However, along with
numerous advantages, private ordering also has problems.
Private orders might, for example: become a hostage of
powerful interest groups; pay inadequate attention to vio-
lations of human rights; and be plagued by corruption.3
These failures of private ordering often lead to calls by the
public, community groups, and businesses, for interven-
tion, which can even include restoring public prerogative
over areas subject to the rule of private orders. Both public
and private orders are then in a difficult position. The
former must decide whether and how to intervene in pri-
vate orders, and the latter how to prevent, and potentially
address, such interventions.
While economic governance scholars have documented
how and why the role of private ordering has increased,
they have produced little research on the interaction
between private orders, on the one hand, and states and
supra-national organizations (public orders), on the other.4
Likewise, while much is known about the mechanisms that
ensure the successful functioning of private orders,5 the
role of public orders in the evolution of private orders is
still unclear. This article offers a new insight to fill this
knowledge gap.
This paper studies the role of public orders in the
emergence and evolution of private orders. First, the paper
introduces a model of interactions and then illustrates its
application using the example of the private legal order
created by FIFA—the world governing body of football.
Fe´de´ration Internationale de Football Association, better
known as FIFA, has long been associated with its ability to
govern and commercialize the game of football, and, lately,
also with large corruption scandals.6 FIFA thus exemplifies
both the advantages of private ordering as well its failures.
This makes FIFA’s private order an ideal case for studying
the role of public orders in the evolution of private orders.
In this context, the paper illuminates some otherwise
puzzling state practices, i.e., state’s inconsistency in whe-
ther they tolerate alternative control of employment rela-
tions by sport associations, their anti-competitive behavior,
and governance problems.
Our analysis indicates that public orders challenge pri-
vate orders in cases of excess, especially in limiting the
potential of powerful interest groups.7 Otherwise, public
orders usually respect the freedom of private orders to self-
regulate their activities and influence private orders by soft
and indirect means. This is similar, we argue, to the case of
nation states in which the key role in limiting excessive
powers of elites belongs to the civil society. The analogy—
the state as the civil society—provides yet another unex-
plored perspective on the role that states have when
intervening in private orders.8 These results, although
illustrated using the example of FIFA, have implications
for the successful functioning of private orders in general,
be it business, sport, or any other member association.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Part 2 sets
up the landscape by (a) introducing the advantages and
disadvantages of private ordering, (b) indicating the role
public orders play in the emergence and evolution of pri-
vate orders, and (c) identifying limitations of current
research. Part 3 introduces a model of how private orders
evolve under constraints provided by public orders. This
part theorizes about the role that public orders play (and
also should play) in the emergence and evolution of
member associations. It is hypothesized that if a public
order does not intervene directly into the constituency of a
legitimate member association, such an order is, and will
be, more effective in locking all involved actors. Part 4
applies this model to examine the private legal order of
FIFA. At the end, we offer some conclusions.
2 See Bernstein (1992, 2001) and Greif (1993), p. 542. For the
discussion of the advantages of private ordering, see Sect. 2.1 below.
3 Leisinger (2009). We recognize that corruption is not only a
problem of private ordering. States may be corrupt as well.
Democratic states, however, have a system of check-and-ballances
that tackle corruption. Private orders do not have such mechanisms, as
a rule.
4 Accordingly, the question as to when private modes of governance
can fill the void left by public orders is fairly settled.
5 Hadfield and Weingast (2012) (arguing that decentralized enforce-
ment system based on a collective punishment mechanism is, to some
extent, the necessary feature of any legal order; such system is an
equilibrium provided that there is an institution classifying behavior
as wrongful or not). See also Gibbons and Henderson (2012).
6 Jennings (2011).
7 By power interest groups, we mean groups formed inside private
orders to promote their own interests, thereby completely changing
the legitimate nature of these orders.
8 Civil society is broadly defined as ‘‘the process through which
individuals’’, represented by various voluntary associations, ‘‘nego-
tiate, argue, struggle against or agree with each other and with the
centers of political and economic authority’’ Kaldor (2003), p. 585
(arguing that the definition of civil society has been constantly
developing). Scholte (2004), p. 214 (defining civil society as ‘‘a
political space where voluntary associations seek, from outside
political parties, to shape the rules that govern one or the other aspect
of social life’’).
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2 Outside the legal-centric view: private
ordering
Undesirable monopoly and market power, negative exter-
nalities, the failure to provide public goods, and severe
information asymmetries are the sources of market fail-
ures.9 Market failures plague the competitive trade of
commodities and services; hence, resources are not dis-
tributed based on their most valued use. Often when we
face market failures and consider solutions for them, the
prime candidate for intervention is the state. Accordingly,
states sometimes replace or change some of the market
properties, including its institutions.10 This classic state-
centric paradigm has, however, been criticized for its
failure to provide good order and workable arrangements in
various circumstances. For example, the state’s monopoly
to regulate effectively cyber-crime and other transnational
activities within its ‘‘territory’’ is a myth.11 It is docu-
mented that private orders can step in and offer institutional
support in areas that are beyond the reach of the state.12
Typical instances include (1) private orders that predate
modern states, such as private prosecution associations
during the Industrial Revolution in England,13 (2) private
orders in current-day developing countries where weak
state institutions are insufficient to support economic
activities, and (3) illegal underworld activities, such as
pirate organizations14 and mafia, which obviously cannot
rely on state-supplied laws.15 There are, however, also
contemporary private orders, such as sport and business
associations that successfully function along established
states. These non-state modes of governance develop
institutions that support order and cooperation.16 Their
existence complicates our understanding of how to address
market failures best.
2.1 Advantages and problems of private
ordering
Private modes of governance are often better accustomed
to provide good order and workable arrangements than the
state. Research on economics of governance provides
valuable insights into the functioning of private modes of
governance.17 This scholarship identified the two main
advantages of private ordering compared to public order-
ing. One is informational advantage in designing special-
ized rules of behavior and resolving the arising disputes in
swift, qualified, and sometimes even less costly manner.
Another is the responsiveness of the order to the needs of
the involved actors owing to the greater involvement of the
actors in the formation of the rules. These advantages stand
behind the success of many private orders.18 This, how-
ever, does not imply that such private orders are neces-
sarily efficient or legitimate.19
Indeed, it is equally true that private ordering is prone to
two potential failures. First, private-order institutions are
not necessarily the most efficient from the perspective of
maximizing social welfare. Consider illegitimate private
orders, such as Ku Klux Klan, that can be built on dis-
crimination, racism, and other rationales that, if accom-
plished, lead to excessive costs for third parties.20 While
such illegitimate orders may develop institutions ensuring
internal cooperation and promoting common ends, such
institutions create a net loss for society.21 Furthermore,
cartel agreements between businesses, price signaling,
misuse of power, and other activities that make markets
less competitive—and therefore decrease the overall wel-
fare of society—may be the most rational and efficient
course of action for members of some private orders.22
Therefore, private ordering may create negative externali-
ties that are undesirable for society at large.
Second, even if we disregard negative effects that pri-
vate orders may inflict on third parties, powerful interests
groups may make private orders rotten from inside, thereby
9 In economics, market failures are not socially desirable because
they limit the establishment of ‘general equilibrium’, meaning a
situation where ‘‘competitive forces have led to the equality of
marginal benefit and marginal cost in the market for every single
commodity and service’’. Cooter and Ulen (2012), p. 38.
10 Organization generally refers to an authority that can decide how
formal institutions are structured and/or implement formal institu-
tions. Institutions are then rules of the game, i.e. formal ‘‘constrains
that structure political, economic and social interaction’’. See North
(1991), p. 97. See also Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) and Greif
(2006).
11 Ip 2011; See generally Nye and Keohane (1971); In the field of law
and economics, see generally Katz (1996), p. 1754.
12 See Bernstein (1992), Greif (1993) and Ellickson (2016). How-
ever, the critical literature is doubting the actual prevalence of some
private orders in the past, see Ogilvie and Carus (2014) (showing
weaknesses in a number of stylized historical facts such as that the
Glorious Revolution of 1688 lead to the sudden emergence of secure
property rights).
13 See Koyama (2012).
14 See Leeson (2009).
15 Milhaupt and West (2000).
16 Bernstein (1992, 2001) and Gomtsian (2017).
17 Williamson (2005).
18 Some argue that the key reason is that private orders are able to
manage transactions more efficiently than the state would, see
generally Posner (1996), pp. 1700–1701; Dixit (2004), pp. 32–48.
19 Please note that the critical literature challenges the efficiency and
legitimacy of private ordering, among many other see Claire Cutler
(2010) and Calliess and Zumbansen (2010).
20 Fukuyama (2000) Social Capital and Civil Society. IMF Working
Paper No. 0074, p. 4.
21 See Posner (1996), pp. 1700–1701 (discussing the negative
externality argument).
22 Cooter and Ulen (2012), p. 38.
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undermining value creation by private orders for its own
members. These groups might involve wide-variety of
players such as the bureaucrats that misuse their power for
private gains and majority shareholders that manipulate
resources in their corporation at the expense of the non-
controlling investors. When a private order is rotten, eco-
nomic value is merely transferred from one to another
group, rather than created.23 Thus, the powerful interest
groups may prevent value creation as well as tunnel the
private orders’ wealth at the expense of all others, thereby
harming the private order as a whole.
Because of the advantages and problems of private
ordering, its impact on overall efficiency and welfare is
unclear. The private ordering of industry associations,
professional clubs, academic societies, and other member
associations exemplify this controversy. By member asso-
ciations we mean (1) private, formal, and self-governed
entities; that are typically (2) non-commercial and non-
profit, and that (3) facilitate the provision of collective
goods to their members.24 While many scholars have a
positive stand on the overall effects of associations—no-
tably ‘social capital’ literature argues that such associations
are the source of effective democracy and social capital25;
studies in organizational economics are optimistic as
well26—there are also less optimistic findings. For exam-
ple, Maria Larrain and Jens Pru¨fer explore whether the
incentives of associations to lobby lawmakers has positive
or negative effects on economy. They show that ‘good
lobbying’—influencing the political reform process to
increase the level of property rights protection—and ‘bad
lobbying’—influencing rent-distribution to the detriment of
nonmembers—are complements. This means that associa-
tions can exert valuable pressure on ineffective govern-
ments. On the other hand, however, these associations may
also provide detrimental pressure on a legal system that
functions well.27 Therefore, there is uncertainty about the
impact of membership associations, and private orders in
general, to overall efficiency and welfare. It is under this
uncertainty that policy makers operate. They have to
decide whether and how to promote, ignore, change, or
prohibit altogether certain associations.
2.2 The limits of private ordering by member
associations
The state plays a key role when it comes to the emergence
and evolution of membership associations. The ways in
which states affect societies in general, and membership
associations in particular, through their interventions,
abstentions, and relationships with private orders has been
in the centrum of attention for decades. Notably, Theda
Skocpol in her project ‘Bringing the State Back In’ artic-
ulated two key perspectives on how the state affects private
orders.28 The first way—‘Weberian’—focuses on the
capacity of the state to influence private orders. Obviously,
the state’s capacity to cope with various problems is not
static: it might increase, decrease, and even disappear. The
second way—‘Tocquevillian’—focuses on indirect influ-
ence of the state. From this perspective, ‘‘states matter not
simply because of the goal-oriented activities of state
officials. They matter because their organizational config-
urations, along with their overall patterns of activity, affect
political culture; encourage some kinds of group formation
and collective political actions […]’’.29 The ways in which
the state influences—both from the Weberian and the
Tocquevillian perspectives—the emergence and evolution
of membership associations is summarized in Table 1
below.
From the Weberian perspective, the state can authori-
tatively prohibit certain forms of private ordering and thus
prevent their emergence. In many cases, however, private
ordering springs-up from society. This is mainly because
public orders are unable to provide order and effective
regulation in every field. Indeed, the grassroots of mem-
bership associations can be found even in the world’s most
repressive countries—for example, the failure of the North
Korean economy to prevent famine in 1990s necessitated
illegal, but tolerated, entrepreneurial responses to secure
food.30 Therefore, even in states that are very hostile to
private ordering, private ordering emerges due to the lack
of capacity, or the willingness, of public orders to regulate
in certain areas of societal life.
Moreover, public orders may actively work towards the
expansion of member associations and initiate the emer-
gence of new associations. For example, public orders
nudge businesses, member associations, and other private
actors to organize activities in areas in which public reg-
ulation has neither the ability nor the competence to
23 See generally Libecap (1989) (discussing the risk that powerful
interest groups may block the emergence of utilitarian property rights
arrangements).
24 Schofer and Longhofer (2011), p. 542.
25 Social capital is cooperative links between people such as common
identity and friendship. See, for example Fukuyama supra note 18.
26 Tirole (1996).
27 Larrain and Pru¨fer (2015) (stressing that if property rights are
better protected by the state than by private orders, associations have
the capacities to bias laws and regulations as a result of lobbying, and
to influence public opinion and policy outcomes).
28 Skocpol et al. (1986).
29 Ibid, p. 21.
30 Consequently, a hybrid private/Party sector has been created not
only as a survival strategy, but also to satisfy a wider range of needs.
Noland (2016), pp. 234–245; See also Tudor and Pearson (2015),
pp. 16–20.
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conduct a particular regulatory activity.31 Various forms of
public–private co-regulation are yet another example of the
complexity that stand behind the emergence and evolution
of private ordering.32
Furthermore, the state influences the evolution of
member associations by granting powerful regulatory
privileges as well as by limiting the freedom of contract.
Granting powerful privileges, on the one hand, could help
establishing strong associations based on high contractual
stability, while not granting the privileges, on the other
hand, may prevent such an establishment. Consider state
law constraints that many member associations—such as
lawyer associations—face. Associations of lawyers, for
example, are constrained by state laws to create rules that
would prohibit lawyers to terminate their employment
contracts with law firms without cause, before expiry and
without paying compensation.33 These public constraints,
for example, do not exist in the case of football regulation
that—differently from lawyers—has evolved in a global
system based on strong contractual stability.34
From the Tocquevillian perspective, the role of public
orders in the emergence and evolution of member associ-
ations is indirect. Unlike the direct role of the public orders,
however, the indirect role is largely unexplored.35 Schol-
ars, for example, observe that the expansion of the modern
state influence the emergence and evolution of membership
associations.36 Consider US foreign anti-bribery enforce-
ment that has resulted in rapid proliferation of anti-cor-
ruption interest groups during the last years. Expansive
enforcement of state laws put the issue of international
corruption on the agenda and set the basis of new anti-
corruption industry that generated multiple membership
associations.37
Furthermore, the emergence and evolution of modern
member associations depends, to a large extend, on the
openness of states to tolerate them.38 If state’s overall
pattern of activity is to discourage some forms of private
ordering—being it because of negative externalities, asso-
ciations’ internal problems, or simply because of pater-
nalism and restrictive state policies—many associations
will not emerge and the existing ones will dissolve under
state pressure. Consider, legal problems sharing economy
firms, such as ridesharing and home-sharing platforms,
have faced. Cities, states, and other public orders, in the
name of public safety, health, and corporate social
responsibility, have limited the freedom of action of these
platforms and their users.39 Therefore, an association will
emerge and sustain more likely in societies that tolerate
them, for example, by ensuring broad freedom of
contract.40
Accordingly, the Weberian and Tocquevillian perspec-
tives indicate that the emergence and evolution of modern
member associations is influenced by complex public–
private interactions. These interactions are shaped not only
by goal-oriented public orders but also indirectly, by the
overall patterns of activity of these orders. This shows that
member associations usually face various direct and indi-
rect constraints that public orders impose on them. Scholars
investigating the emergence and evolution of good order
should incorporate the composition of the said public–
private interactions as well as the character of constraints
provided by public orders into their research agendas. The
following parts discuss how to do it.
31 See Cafaggi and Iamiceli (2014) and Cafaggi (2012) (addressing
transnational private regulation as an instrument to produce and
protect global public goods).
32 See generally de Bu´rca et al. (2014).
33 Gomtsian (2017), p. 64.
34 For the analysis of transnational self-regulation in professional
services, see Delimatsis (2017) (arguing that we cannot yet see truly
transnational private regulation in professional services, but that the
foundations for such regulation are being built progressively).
35 Note that we see some of the prominent economic governance
scholars recently advocating for the use of the ‘Tocquevillian’
approach in the studies of private ordering. See Ellickson (2016).
36 Schofer and Longhofer (2011), pp. 544–546.
37 See generally Rose-Ackerman (2011).
38 Schofer and Longhofer (2011).
39 Ranchordas (2015).
40 See Ellickson (2016), p. 250.
Table 1 Perspectives on the role of public orders in the emergence and evolution of member associations
Weberian State (goal-oriented) Tocquevillian State (indirect influence)
The lack of capacity, or the willingness, of public orders to regulate in
certain areas leads to the emergence of private ordering
Public orders give associations incentives to expand the scope of their
activities
Public orders may grant regulatory privileges as well as limit the freedom
of contract of certain associations
Overall patterns of the activity of public orders indirectly influence
the emergence and evolution of private ordering
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2.3 Illusion of purity—beyond purely private
and purely public view
Purely public and purely private modes of governance do
not exist. In fact, sticking too much to traditional public–
private divide could develop doubts about the ability of
researchers to say something useful as far as the emergence
and evolution of good order is concerned. In this context, a
massive scholarly effort was devoted to the issue of juris-
diction, i.e., who—public order or private order—is more
efficient.41 Naturally, states should intervene, and possibly
disintegrate, private orders that deviate from universally
agreed societal standards. Yet, in many cases government
representatives face various trade-offs that may decrease
the value of their potential involvement in particular reg-
ulatory area. Consider how the state commonly erects
barriers to entry in industries such as the defense and air-
craft industry to safeguard public health, environment, and
safety.42 Moreover, the use of anti-trust laws to mitigate
activities that make markets less competitive, clearly has
trade-offs as it can block, for example, innovation and
value-maximizing agreements among competitors.43
There is broad consensus that the state should set aside
inefficient private norms. The economic governance
scholars, however, urge that the state should intervene only
if it has good information about such inefficiency. Other-
wise, any state intervention is more likely to be redundant
and weaken private orders by challenging the functioning
of their established rules and other mechanisms.44 There-
fore, a general rule of thumb for public orders is not to
intervene in private orders if they are uncertain about their
efficiency.
The advice about ‘non-intervention’ in private orders,
however, applies only in some situations. In other words,
the discussion about jurisdiction focuses only on one aspect
of the relationship between public and private ordering.
Most importantly, the discussion does not focus on the fact
that the success of many private orders is associated with
co-determination. This means that the various roles public
orders play—from both the Weberian and Tocquevillian
perspectives—in the emergence and evolution of private
orders are missing from the discussion.45 To advance dis-
cussions on the emergence of good order, we provide a
model of how private orders evolve under constraints
provided by public orders.
3 The model of interventions—public
orders and membership associations
Game-changing events that lead to financial success,
political revolutions, or innovation, do not come ‘‘out of
the blue’’; they are supported by institutions. However, the
formation of ‘‘right institutions’’, particularly in a global-
ized world, is a mystery. This mystery often depends on the
context in which institutions function. For example, private
orders such as mafia might be inferior to the centralized
provision of reliable institutions by states, but in the
absence of state action, even such substandard alternatives
create economic value.46 Exclusive supply of institutions
by the state may lead to similar outcome. Consider, for
instance, public orders based on the exclusion of civil
society and the lack of accountability of institutions.47
Although it is likely that such centralized public orders
may forgo the efficiency gains of private ordering by
completely denying any private ordering, they may create
economic value in cases in which no better alternative can
ensure basic public goods. These orders are better than a
state of civil war accompanied by chaos, torture, and death,
as can be witnessed in a number of contemporary con-
flicts.48 The described orders, however, are far from ideal,
and societies need to be looking for alternatives that are
more efficient. We see such alternative in the existence of
constrained private orders.
41 Note that the key condition for successful functioning of some
private orders is the legal system. Hence, the state also directly
influences private ordering by forcing private entities to choose from
different distributions of ownership forms. See Hansmann (2000)
(arguing that the success of a particular form depends on the balance
between the costs of contracting in the market and the costs of
particular form).
42 In other industries such as energy and telecommunications,
however, public orders are liberalizing historically foreclosed mar-
kets. See, for example, Competition Policy and an Internal Energy
Market, Study of the European Parliament, July 2017. https://www.
lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2016-08_Colomo.pdf. Accessed
23 Jan 2017.
43 For example, anti-competitive activities are a main feature of the
EU’s work that, through the European Commission and the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), has defined a number of
special responsibilities for large economic operators. Moreover,
consider also bans on illegal agreements among competitors to refuse
to deal with other competitors. See Richman (2009) (claiming that
coordinated refusals among competitors may promote economic
welfare).
44 Katz (1996), p. 1752.
45 See the discussion in Sect. 2.2 above.
46 See McMillan and Woodruff (2000).
47 Acemoglu and Robinson (2016). Paths to Inclusive Political
Institutions, p. 3. http://scholar-harris.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/
jamesrobinson/files/path_to_inclusive_political_institutions.pdf. 23
Jans 2017.
48 See, for example, Human Rights Watch. Syria. https://www.hrw.
org/middle-east/n-africa/syria. 23 January 2017.
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3.1 The importance of private orders being
constrained
Our central premise is that the success of modern private
orders is closely associated with the constraints imposed by
public orders. The fact that member associations are, at
least to some extent, constrained private orders represents
an opportunity that the two failures of private ordering—
negative externalities and internal imbalances—will be
reduced to the minimum. At the same time, being a con-
strained private order that does not need—and does not
face—public interventions, means that the advantages of
private ordering can be used to the fullest and benefit both
private ordering and society as whole.
Our premise about the importance of constrained private
orders is based on the assumption that many current soci-
eties struggle to produce welfare particularly because elitist
groups, which have a natural tendency to use the order for
promoting self-gain, lead them. The elites use such order
‘‘to limit economic entry to create rents, and then using the
rents to stabilize the political system and limit violence’’.49
In other words, these orders are tools of the powerful to
remain in the lead. To remain in control, the elitist groups
create, and often legitimize, institutions that dispropor-
tionally disadvantage other groups. Moreover, such orders
are very likely inefficient because the said limitations of
economic entry result in a system in which economic value
is merely transferred from one to another group instead of
being created.50 Therefore, elitists have not only the ten-
dency to undermine the creation of institutions ensuring
equal distribution, but also the creation of economic value.
The result is a sub-optimal private order.
In this context, the success of modern society is closely
associated with constraints that are imposed on the existing
power structures. For example, Daron Acemoglu and
James Robinson see these constraints in the existence of
‘inclusive institutions’. They argue that the societal eco-
nomic success is dependent on the emergence of ‘inclusive
political institutions’, characterized by pluralism and
political centralization, and ‘inclusive economic institu-
tions’, characterized by law and order, and relatively
secured property rights.51 This type of institutions allows
the transition between orders based on the rent-creation by
elitist groups and those based on open and competitive
environment.52 Certainly, the established power groups
oppose inclusive political and economic institutions
because these institutions, effective in creating value
though they may be, threaten the position of elites. They
may lose their monopolies in both political and economic
life. The answer to the question why some states have
exclusive and others inclusive institutions is then in the
ability of civil society to impose checks on the existing
elites, thereby constraining their ability to maintain the
established equilibrium.53 Therefore, institutions that con-
strain orders created by elitist groups are extremely
important for modern societal development.
While the above-discussed theories generally apply to
the successful functioning of public orders, we propose
extending them to the successful functioning of private
orders. The emergence of inclusive institutions requires
constraining private orders to limit the excessive power of
elitist groups. If such constraints are available, and the
private order is able to avoid excessive external interven-
tions by public orders, it is reasonable to assume that such
constrained private orders are likely to limit the failures of
private ordering. This is because extreme deviations from
fundamental rules and norms supported by a relevant
public order would provoke the very thing private orders
tried to avoid—external interventions into their domain. In
other words, when a membership association ignores the
problem of negative externalities or becomes heavily
unbalanced by abusing the position of weak constituencies,
it is, in fact, inviting the state to intervene, thereby
undermining its own authority. Therefore, if membership
associations are constrained, and meanwhile are able to
refrain from excessive external interventions, they are more
likely to create a private order based on inclusive institu-
tions than if they are not constrained. Being constrained
may be the best outcome for any membership associations.
3.2 Advancing the discussion: the state
in the role of civil society
The role of public orders in the evolution of successful
private orders is to ensure that private orders have the
freedom to utilize their advantages and, at the same time,
ensure that negative consequences of private ordering are
not dominant. We can draw parallels with the case of
nation states in which the key role in limiting excessive
powers of elites belongs to the civil society.54 In the case of
private orders, the state is ‘civil society’. Moreover,
49 North et al. (2006) A conceptual framework for interpreting
recorded human history, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Working Paper 12795, p. 2. http://www.nber.org/papers/w12795.
Accessed 23 Jan 2017; See also North et al. (2009).
50 See Libecap (1989) and comment in supra note 23.
51 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), pp. 81–82. For example, in
Ancient Athens and Early Modern England, inclusive political
institutions emerged ‘‘from a balanced increase in state capacity
and the distribution of power’’. Acemoglu and Robinson supra note
47.
52 See generally North supra note 49.
53 Acemoglu, Robinson. State building: a political economy per-
spective (forthcoming in 2018).
54 Ibid; Acemoglu and Robinson supra note 47, pp. 2–3, 5–15.
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policing elites in monopolistic private orders is even a
more complicated and urgent task because there is often no
direct representation of constituencies inside the order. As
a result, the elites of a private order are more likely to
become detached from the constituencies whose interests
they are supposed to look after. Public orders then assume
the role of ‘civil society’ in interacting with private orders.
This requires public orders to play two interconnected, but
different, roles. The first role is authoritative, as it includes
the capacity to change, limit, or even prohibit certain
functions of private orders. The second role is indirect, as it
requires public orders to influence private ordering while
respecting their rules and ways they want to operate. The
model of public interventions is illustrated in the chart be-
low (Fig. 1).
In their first role, public orders may have capacity to
intervene authoritatively in private orders. The higher
negative externalities and internal imbalances are, the more
concern a public order interested in efficiency will show for
mitigating the said failures of private ordering. In these
occasions, however, public orders should follow the advice
provided by the economic governance scholarship and
intervene only if they have good information about ineffi-
ciencies of private ordering. Public orders should challenge
private orders in case of negative externalities and other
failures, particularly to limit the potential of powerful
interest groups that are emerging inside private orders to
promote their self-interest, thereby completely changing
the legitimate nature of these orders.55 By challenging, we
mean authoritative interventions such as overruling a
decision of member associations to, for example, include
certain interest groups in decision-making processes within
the associations. Naturally, the effectiveness of such
interventions also depends on the capacity of public orders
to do so.
Importantly, stronger power of a public order does not,
and certainly should not mean more intensive and frequent
external interventions in private orders. History suggests
that if the state does not tolerate private ordering, then the
state’s interventions are directed towards replacing suc-
cessful private orders, rather than strengthening them.56 If
public interventions, for example, replace private ordering
by unstable contractual relations, costlier dispute resolution
and enforcement mechanisms, and red tape, economic
value will be lost. Therefore, reclaiming the power to assist
and improve private orders should be a matter of scale.
Hence, stronger power of a public order rather means,
and should mean, that the state accepts the role in which it
can be replaced, perhaps temporarily, by a private order.
Accordingly, the co-evolution of powerful private and
public orders implies strategic external interventions that
correct the failures of private ordering, but do not meddle
into the internal affairs of the private order too much. In
other words, the public–private interactions direct the
evolution of private orders by setting a starting benchmark
of freedom, but then stepping back and letting private
ordering function within such benchmark.
This, however, does not prevent public orders from
influencing private orders, even if they function within the
said benchmark. In their second role, hence, public orders
should be acting, as an equal partner to private orders, for
example when co-determining the substance of institutions
in a regulatory space that the state shares with private
orders.57 From this perspective, some of state interventions
may be similar to a democratic process in which the civil
society influences public decision-making. Public orders
may protect private orders in the same manner as the civil
society protects the state capture by powerful interest
groups.58 It must be noted, however, that even if the state
acts as an equal partner to private orders, it still may seek to
prefer its own interests rather than private-order’s interests.
For example, it may use lobbing, or negotiate with, private
orders with a view to change their rules in a way that
benefit the public order. Nevertheless, as long as public
orders recognize the advantages of private ordering and use
such strategies carefully, their self-interest cannot desta-
bilize the entire systems of private orders. To the contrary,
overall, these interactions can strengthen private orders,
rather than weaken them because they limit power disbal-
ances inside private orders. The public–private interactions
55 Note that while private ordering sometimes emerges beyond the
reach of the state—for example as a consequence of weak state
institutions—private orders in some way impinge on the state’s
jurisdiction and their ability to govern a given field is limited by the
sovereign power of states which can reclaim, more successfully or
less successfully, the authority.
56 Masten and Pru¨fer (2014). The discussed advantages of private
ordering are closely related with the notion of civil society. Civil
society is a precondition of modern social development that plays the
key role in the transition between orders based on the rent-creation
and open access orders based on free competition. See generally
North supra note 49.
57 Switzerland is an example of a public order that recognizes the
benefits of private orders and intervenes only in the most wanting
cases. See, for example, Duval (2015), pp. 246–247. Another example
is the EU that has always expressed great respect for autonomy and
self-regulation in sports. However, this comes with a condition: the
EU Commission makes it clear that good governance and respect for
EU law is a condition for the self-regulation and autonomy of sports.
See EU Commission, Communication ‘‘Developing the European
Dimension in Sport’’ (Jan 2011). Cf. Meier and Garcia (2015), p. 893
(arguing that FIFA has a market power to impose its will on national
governments).
58 Hellman et al. 2000. ‘‘Seize the State, Seize the Day’’. State
Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition. Policy Research
Working Paper, The World Bank Institute. http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/seize_synth.pdf.
Accessed 23 Jan 2018.
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involving the private order of FIFA are the example of this
dynamics.
4 Case study: FIFA’s private order
FIFA is an association that not only promotes the game of
football, organizes international football tournaments, but
it is also an economic operator. Powerful sponsors support
FIFA; it negotiates billions of dollars in annual revenues
through sales of media and marketing rights, and receives
massive tax exemptions in a number of countries.59
Alongside its commercial success, FIFA has come under
intense criticism for its controversial practices, including
corruption, money laundering, and its support and super-
vision of sporting events that are connected with the vio-
lations of fundamental rights.60 It is, however, important to
distinguish failures in FIFA’s management and adminis-
tration from its advances in building and maintaining glo-
bal legal order that materialized many of the advantages of
private ordering. Keeping these advantages while limiting
negative externalities, corruption, and other undesirable
practices is the key problem that FIFA and public orders
face.
4.1 FIFA as a global regulator
FIFA is a powerful regulator. FIFA’s legal order goes way
beyond playing rules and coordination of the timetables.61
For example, football clubs have to comply with various
professional, integrity, and financial rules to secure a
license to participate in international and, as a rule, top-
division national competitions.62 Furthermore, employ-
ment matters cover relations between the clubs and their
primary employees—professional athletes—and relations
among different clubs with regard to soliciting professional
athletes from each other.63
With the purpose of protecting its monopoly, FIFA has
developed a complex organizational structure, including its
member associations, in most of the cases each represent-
ing one independent country, and six confederations.64
Furthermore, FIFA has also private dispute resolution
venues and sophisticated system of sanctions and incen-
tives promoting compliance with the decisions of the pri-
vate order’s dispute resolution bodies.65 Particularly, FIFA
recognizes the mandatory jurisdiction of the Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) to decide on disputes between
FIFA, its members, confederations, leagues, clubs, players,
intermediaries, and other involved parties.66 This complex
mechanism ensures compliance with FIFA’s global order.
Direct 
intervenon
Reversed Civil 
Society
Public orders should set a 
starng benchmark of 
freedom, but then step back 
and act as a reversed civil 
society
• public orders should intervene only if they have 
good informaon about ineﬃciencies of private 
ordering (negave externalies and governance 
problems)
• public orders should accept the role in which 
they can be temporarily replaced by a private 
order
• public orders in their role of a reversed civil
society should protect private orders from being
taken over by powerful interest groups
Fig. 1 The model of interventions
59 FIFA Financial Report 2016. https://resources.fifa.com/mm/docu
ment/affederation/footballgovernance/02/87/89/44/fr2016digitalen_
neutral.pdf. Accessed 23 Jan 2018; Mitra (2015), pp. 7–8 (analyzing
FIFA’s tax exemption during the 2014 World Cup in Brazil).
60 See, for example, Pielke 2013.
61 See FIFA, Laws of the game 2015/2016. http://resources.fifa.com/
mm/document/footballdevelopment/refereeing/02/36/01/11/lawsofthe
gameweben_neutral.pdf. Accessed 23 Jan 2018.
62 See Article 2291 and 4311 of FIFA Regulations: club licensing,
2007. http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administra
tion/67/17/66/club_licensing_regulations_en_47341.pdf. Accessed 23
Jan 2018.
63 See FIFA Regulations on the status and transfer of players, 2015.
https://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/
02/70/95/52/regulationsonthestatusandtransferofplayersjune2016_e_
neutral.pdf. Accessed 23 Jan 2018 (hereinafter Transfer Regulations).
64 FIFA is an umbrella organization consisting of 211 national
associations operating within six continental confederations.
65 For a detailed discussion of FIFA’s private legal order and the
system of rules and incentives that promote compliance with the
order, see Gomtsian (2017).
66 See Article 66 of FIFA Statutes. FIFA Statutes: Regulations
Governing the Application of the Statutes Standing Orders of the
Congress, April 2015. http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affedera
tion/generic/02/58/14/48/2015fifastatutesen_neutral.pdf. Accessed 23
Jan 2018.
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FIFA obliges its confederations to ensure that interna-
tional football competitions with the participation of the
clubs from national associations are not be organized
without the consent of the affected confederation and the
approval of FIFA.67 Such consent is de facto conditional
upon compliance with FIFA’s rules, including an obliga-
tion to comply with the decisions of FIFA and the CAS. In
this way, FIFA effectively regulates every party that par-
ticipates in organized football competitions, including
players, clubs, coaches, managers, club investors, officials,
sponsors, and spectators.
4.2 Direct intervention of the EU into FIFA
To be fair, not all the credit behind the expansion of FIFA’s
private order goes to FIFA alone. Public orders, such as the
sovereign jurisdictions of FIFA’s member associations and
supra-national organizations like the EU, influence the
evolution of the order.68 This influence is the result of strong
tensions between FIFA’s regulatory autonomy and the
sovereign power of public orders. The contradictions are
especially visible in matters related to equality and/or non-
discrimination of workers, the treatment and qualification of
minors, the freedom to choose employment, and the freedom
of movement. For example, the inability of players to ter-
minate their contracts without cause, before expiry and
without paying compensation, is in stark contrast with tra-
ditional employment laws, according to which employees
are free to end employment without cause by prior notice.69
The rise of FIFA was, at the first stage, made possible by the
reluctance of states and supra-national organizations such as
the EU, to intervene in the governance of football. FIFA is an
international private association established in Switzerland, a
country where local authorities and courts have always been
reluctant to intervene into the internal affairs of private asso-
ciations. In addition, sports in general and football in partic-
ular have always received special treatment, which prevented
too much state involvement.70 In effect, FIFA, as most
member associations would naturally try to do, filled regula-
tory gaps by designing specific regulations. In other words, the
lack of attention of public orders to provide effective institu-
tions resulted in a self-regulation of football actors.
With the commercialization of football and the increasing
influence of FIFA’s private order, however, public orders, and
mainly the EU have become more active. At this stage, the EU
authoritatively defined the acceptable benchmark of FIFA’s
activities, at least when the EU law and FIFA’s transfer system
is concerned. The groundbreaking case here is the Bosman
ruling of the CJEU.71 Prior to this decision, football players
were tied to their clubs indefinitely and could move between
clubs only after the payment of compensation. When the
employment contract of Jean-Marc Bosman in his Belgian
club expired, he intended to move and play for a French
football club. The latter, however, was not willing to pay the
transfer fee and, as a result, the Belgian football authorities did
not transfer the player’s certificate, rendering Mr. Bosman
ineligible for playing in France. Mr. Bosman took the matter to
court and the CJEU declared the rule incompatible with the
freedom of movement for workers and competition law.72
This decision set a starting benchmark of the freedom of pri-
vate order to self-regulate, leading to the reshaping process of
transfer rules into FIFA’s order we know today. After Bosman,
the EU and states stepped back and allowed FIFA self-regulate
within the constraints imposed by public orders. We illustrate
these developments in the following sections.
4.3 The EU in the role of a reversed civil society
Bosman was, until the FIFA-gate scandal,73 the only major
authoritative intervention of a public order into the FIFA’s
affairs. The implication of the CJEU’s decision was that the old
system was not effective anymore, but neither the EU, nor
European countries took the initiative to design new transfer
rules. Public orders, based on the idea of the autonomy of
sports, let FIFA and UEFA, the governing body of European
football, to draft new transfer rules that would meet the needs of
football-related actors and at the same time would satisfy the
requirements of the laws of public orders. In other words, the
European Commission did not impose minimum requirements
that had to be complied with by FIFA in the process of
designing new transfer rules. The European Commission,
instead, recognized the advantages of private ordering in this
field and preferred to preserve the private order’s autonomy.74
67 Ibid. Article 20.3 (e).
68 See, for example, Transfer Regulations supra note 63. See
generally (Weatherill 2017; Mataija 2016; Duval and Van Rompuy
2016).
69 Articles 13–15 of the Transfer Regulation provide that ‘‘a contract
between a professional and a club may only be terminated upon (1)
expiry of the term of the contract or by a mutual agreement (Article
13), (2) based on just cause (Article 14), or (3) by the player who has,
in the course of the season, appeared in less than 10% of the official
matches of his/her club (Article 15).
70 See generally Szyszczak (2007), p. 3 et seq.
71 Case C-415/93, URBSFA v. Bosman et al., EU:C:1995:463.
72 See Ibid.
73 See Sect. 4.4 below.
74 Our argument fits into the ongoing discussion about this private–
public interaction in football and beyond, most importantly see
Weatherill (2017) (discussing, among others, a sporting margin of
appreciation and its limits); Mataija (2016) (underlying the tension
between sporting bodies and public orders); Duval and Van Rompuy
(2016) (suggesting that Bosman should be interpreted as the
imposition of a democratic check on the exercise of private power
in football and beyond).
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The European Commission’s role in drafting post-Bos-
man transfer rules is one of the forms how public orders
can act in the role of civil society in the context of private
ordering. The content of transfer rules is a product of
negotiations between the European Commission, FIFA,
UEFA, and FIFPro, the latter a global trade union repre-
senting the interests of professional football players. The
Commission’s role in these negotiations was to ensure the
inclusion of the EU policy rationales into employment
rules in football. The result is a new system that aims to
promote contractual stability between players and clubs
while respecting each player’s right to free movement.75
To achieve this aim, the concept of contractual stability has
been introduced into player transfer rules to replace the
pre-Bosman system of transfer fees.76 Accordingly, trans-
fer fees due after the expiry of a contract have been sub-
stituted with a compensation due for the unilateral
termination of a valid contract without just cause.
Such non-direct-interventions by public orders have also
been the highlight of negotiations about subsequent mod-
ification of FIFA’s order. While the EU have means to
block amendments of FIFA’s private order, it does not
intervene directly. Even if such amendments of FIFA’s
order may come close to violating EU’s freedoms and
competition laws, the CJEU and other EU institutions
refuse to intervene if the changes meet certain minimum
requirements. The first case study below that focuses on so-
called ‘‘third-party ownership’’ illustrates this. The second
study, related to financial integrity in football, highlights
how constant interactions between FIFA and public orders
influence the final form of the amendments in the rules of
FIFA’s private order. The final nature, content, and appli-
cation of amended rules are, rather, the result of a dialogue
taking part between the football stakeholders and the EU
Commission. This rising procedural approach is in detail
illustrated in our third example.
4.3.1 Third party ownership
The first example dates back to December 2014 when FIFA
updated player transfer rules to ban so-called ‘‘third-party
ownership’’ of football players.77 According to the newly
introduced Article 18ter of FIFA’s Regulations on the
Status and Transfer of Players, clubs and players are ban-
ned from entering into an agreement with a third party
which gives the third party any right or interest in relation
to the future transfer of the player to another club.78 A third
party is a party other than the two clubs transferring a
player from one to other, or any previous club with which
the player has been registered.79
Third-party ownership, which became increasingly
popular in late 2000s, allows a third-party private investor
to acquire interest in the future transfer value of the player,
commonly known as a player’s economic rights.80 As a
result, when a player transfers to another club before the
end of the player’s employment contract with his/her cur-
rent club for a transfer fee, the third-party investor is
entitled to a portion of the transfer compensation in pro-
portion to the third-party owner’s share of the economic
rights of the player. The third-party owner can thus earn a
return on its earlier investments if the player’s transfer fee
is higher than the valuation at the time the third party made
the investment; the selling club, in its turn, can use the
money from the third-party owner to sign and develop
players it could not afford otherwise. Some football asso-
ciations banned third-party ownership of footballers earlier.
Particularly, the governing bodies of football in England
outlawed this practice in 2008 following the transfers of
two Argentinian players, Carlos Tevez and Javier
Mascherano, to West Ham United Football Club.81 A
London-based investment fund partially owned the eco-
nomic rights of both players in an arrangement that allowed
the third-party owner to influence player transfer decisions
and the transfer compensation.82 This created potential
conflicts of interests and the English football authorities
imposed an absolute ban on third-party player ownership
from the beginning of the 2008–2009 season.83
Notwithstanding problems associated with third-party
ownership of players’ economic rights, not all in the world75 Czarnota (2013), pp. 3–5, 7. To be fair, the subsequent interpre-
tation of the principle of contractual stability by FIFA’s internal
dispute resolution bodies and the CAS seem to have been gradually
giving priority to contractual stability over free movement. Ibid,
pp. 37–38. In its later cases, the CAS considers it more appropriate to
apply the ‘‘positive interest’’ approach that aims to put the injured
party in the position it would have been if no contractual breach had
occurred. Undoubtedly, the positive interest approach has a stronger
effect on discouraging player mobility than the residual value
approach. See also de Wagen (2011), pp. 42–56.
76 See CAS 2008/A/1519, FC Shakhtar Donetsk v. Matuzalem
Francelino da Silva & Real Zaragoza SAD & FIFA, Award 19 May
2009; CAS 2008/A/1520, Matuzalem Francelino da Silva & Real
Zaragoza SAD v. FC Shakhtar Donetsk & FIFA, Award 19 May 2009.
77 FIFA, Circular no. 1464, December 2014. https://www.fifa.com/
mm/document/affederation/administration/02/49/57/42/tpocircular1464_
en_neutral.pdf. Accessed 12 Jan 2018.
78 Transfer Regulations supra note 63, Article18ter (1).
79 Ibid, Definition 14.
80 Geey (2016).
81 Williams (2009); Wilson, September 2016. Football’s Third-Party
Ownership Rule Explained. BBC News. www.bbc.co.uk/news/
business-37483203. Accessed 12 Jan 2018.
82 Williams (2009), pp. 92–93; Wilson supra note 81.
83 Geey (2016), pp. 245–46.
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of football welcomed the ban imposed by FIFA. In par-
ticular, many in South American countries, Spain, and
Portugal, where the practice of third-party ownership was
widespread, opposed the ban arguing that many local clubs
could not compete on an international level without the
backing of external investors.84 Critics often referred to the
example of Club Atle´tico de Madrid, a club from Madrid
associated with the working class population of the city,
which relied on third-party ownership to sign star players.
Player agents partially financed these deals in arrangements
under which the agents owned stakes in the economic
rights of players.85 If the player transferred, the agent
shared in the profits. This allowed Atle´ti to sign top play-
ers, like Radamel Falcao, and compete both with the
powerhouses of the Spanish football—Real Madrid Club
de Fu´tbol and Futbol Club Barcelona—and
internationally.86
In February 2015, the Spanish and Portuguese profes-
sional football leagues filed complaints on FIFA’s ban of
third-party ownership with the European Commission.87 The
complaint argued that the ban violated the EU’s competition
laws and the fundamental rights to free movement of capital
and labor.88 In turn, UEFA and FIFPro lodged a complaint
with the European Commission questioning the legality of
third-party player ownership under the EU law and asking
the European Commission to endorse FIFA’s ban of third-
party ownership.89 The major concern of UEFA and FIFPro
was the ability of third-party owners to control or influence
the transfer activity of players who were the subject of a
third-party ownership arrangement.90 The economic inter-
ests of external investors could influence transfer decisions
at the expense of the sporting interests of players and clubs.
This would not only cause players to change employment
frequently, sometimes at the risk of not adapting in the new
club, but might also hurt clubs as they needed to fill the gaps
left by the departing players.91 Moreover, since third-party
player ownership arrangements typically require the club to
buy out the external investor if the player is not transferred
or is transferred at a low fee, third-party player ownership
resembles risky borrowing and may threaten club insolvency
if the player is not successful.92
Despite strong arguments that FIFA’s third-party player
ownership ban violated EU’s freedoms and competition
laws,93 the European Commission, upheld the prohibition
by deciding not to initiate formal proceedings.94 According
to the Commission, potential conflicts of interests between
clubs, players, and investors resulting from third-party
ownership of players justify the proportionality of the
absolute ban.95 As a result, the Commission demonstrated
its willingness to recognize the needs in football and
allowed a highly contestable rule to stand.
This case, however, does not imply that FIFA is free to
ignore the rules of public orders. FIFA and public orders are
in constant interaction—be it via direct talks and negotia-
tions or through litigation of football-related matters in state
courts—which test and set the boundaries of autonomy and
self-regulation in football. In effect, despite the fact that
public orders usually tolerate regulatory changes of FIFA’s
order, FIFA reflects the aims of public orders, thereby
ensuring more internal balances between football stake-
holders. UEFA’s Financial Fair Play rules, presented in the
following section, are a revealing example of this dynamics.
4.3.2 Financial fair play
Football generates billions in revenues. Large portion of
the money goes through professional clubs that invest them
to improve their competitiveness on the pitch. The
84 Lindholm (2016), p. 138, La Liga (2016), pp. 236–237, Reck
(2016), p. 244.
85 Simon Kuper, Inside Atle´tico Madrid, FINANCIAL TIMES, November
14, 2015, at 17–18.
86 Id. See also La Liga (n 96), at 237.
87 European Parliament, January 2016. Briefing: ‘‘Third-Party Own-
ership’’ of Football Players. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/ATAG/2016/573940/EPRS_ATA(2016)573940_EN.pdf.
Accessed 12 Jan 2018.
88 Ibid.
89 UEFA, April 2015. UEFA and FIFPro Launch Complaint Against
Third-Party Ownership. http://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/stake
holders/players-unions/news/newsid=2230203.html?redirectFromOrg=
true#/. Accessed 12 Jan 2018.
90 Ibid.
91 Poli (2016) (reporting complaints of a footballer who had to
transfer six times in 7 years after a third-party acquired controlling
interest in the player’s economic rights).
92 Duval A, Maren O, December 2015. Unpacking Doyen’s TPO
Deals: FC Twente’s Game of Maltese Roulette. Asser International
Sports Law Blog. http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/unpack
ing-doyen-s-tpo-deals-fc-twente-s-game-of-maltese-roulette-by-antoine-
duval-and-oskar-van-maren. Accessed 12 Jan 2018.
93 See Lindholm (2016), pp. 140–43; La Liga (2016), p. 238.
According to a report published by the Spanish Competition
Authority, the prohibition of third-party player ownership violates
both national and EU laws. La Liga (2016), p. 238.
94 ESPN, October 2017. European Commission Upholds Third-Party
Ownership Ban. http://www.espn.co.uk/football/blog-fifa/story/
3228435/european-commission-upholds-third-party-ownership-ban.
Accessed 12 Jan 2018.
95 Ibid. Recent reports, however, suggest that third-party player
ownership practices are making a comeback in a new form.
Particularly, external investors use ‘‘intermediary’’ football clubs to
sign players that in fact have never played or trained with the club.
Although the player represents another club, when the player is
transferred, the intermediary club receives all or part of the transfer
fee. Apollon Limassol, a Cypriot football club, was allegedly
involved in signing players from Serbia or Romania who stayed to
play for their cash-strapped home clubs. Apollon acted as a third-
party buyer by purchasing economic rights of players and profiting
from their subsequent transfers to stronger leagues.
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spending of football clubs has spiraled in recent years. In
summer 2017, European transfer spending reached a record
high of €5.6 billion, which was €1.6 billion (40%) more
than in the previous summer transfer window.96 For
example, while Premier League clubs spent a combined
£630 million in the 2013 summer transfer window, it was
already £1.41 billion in the 2017 summer transfer win-
dow.97 The problem is that only small elite of clubs and
owners centered in Europe’s top leagues are profitable.98
Beyond the elite are thousands of clubs and their players
that struggle. This creates a pyramid in which a vast
majority of clubs and governing bodies are at ‘‘‘medium to
high risk’ of financial failure.’’99 To address these con-
cerns, UEFA introduced new regulations that are in stark
contrast to what is generally acceptable under the EU
competition law.
In business, predominantly the market ensures rational
financing of economic operators. Under the danger of
going bankrupt, for example, businesses are generally
allowed to spend in some years more than they earned in
previous years. In football, however, the public orders gave
UEFA freedom to intervene into the market by limiting
such spending by the so-called Financial Fair Play Regu-
lations (FFP).100 The core of the FFP is the break-even
requirement.101 With certain exceptions, this requirement
generally provides that clubs cannot have expenses that are
higher than their previous year’s revenues. The aim of the
FFP is, among others, to ensure that clubs settle their lia-
bilities and to encourage responsible spending for the long-
term benefit of football.102
While, the regulations have allegedly decreased club’s
investments during transfer windows as well as player’s
wages, there is a strong agreement among scholars that the
FFP violates the EU competition rules. Scholars argue that the
break-even requirement is a horizontal agreement between
clubs—crisis cartel—that limits investments.103 Such cartel is
prohibited under Article 101(1)(b) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the CJEU has
repeatedly held that such measures constitute a restriction of
competition by ‘‘object’’.104 Despite a number of legal chal-
lenges in courts, however, the FFP has survived.
The current content of these rules is the result of a complex
process of negotiations. During these negotiations, many
alternative solutions to the break-even rule were possible. The
so-called hard salary caps and bank guarantees would likely be
options that are more balanced than current rules.105 Never-
theless, at the end of the day, the threat of elite clubs to separate
from UEFA to establish their own league outside FIFA’s pri-
vate order was a powerful argument.106 In effect, while the
initial idea of limiting external funding might not have been
well received by public orders, the centrum of these negotia-
tions was inside the world of football that determined its con-
tent. The break-even rule—justified by the need to improve
financial integrity of clubs—favors large clubs and top players.
Their cartelization and rent-shifting, to the detriment of all
others, offset losses related to the decreasing amounts of
external funding for signing new players and other activities.107
While the creation of the cartel may indicate that the non-
direct-intervention of the EU, in fact, did not contribute to a
balance between various interest groups in football governance,
two crucial issues should not be underestimated. First, indeed,
the break-even rule, on the one hand, undermines many aspects
of the EU competition policy. One the other hand, however, it
clearly supports the aims and objectives of the EU policy in the
field of State aid.108 Unlike businesses in serious financial
96 UEFA 2017. The European Club Footballing Landscape,
pp. 36–37, https://uefa.app.box.com/v/benchmarking. Accessed 26
Jan 2018.
97 The Telegraph, September 2015. Premier League transfer window:
Record breaking year as spending reaches £1billion. http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/competitions/premier-league/11837405/
Premier-League-transfer-window-Record-breaking-year-as-spending-
reaches-1billion.html. Accessed 26 Jan 2018. Goal, September 2017.
Premier League Clubs Shatter Transfer Record with £1.4 billion
spending. http://www.goal.com/en-gb/news/premier-league-clubs-
shatter-transfer-records-with-14/nm8q7go476471vibc1ti714tq. Acces-
sed 26 Jan 2018.
98 In the 2017 summer transfer window, English, Italian, French,
Spanish, and German leagues accounted for 80% of spending. UEFA
2017 supra note 96, p. 37.
99 Andrews and Harrington (2016) Off pitch: football’s financial
integrity weaknesses, and how to strengthen them. faculty research
working paper series, p. 2. https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publica
tions/getFile.aspx?Id=1309. Accessed 26 Jan 2018.
100 UEFA, UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regula-
tions, https://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/Tech/
uefaorg/General/02/26/77/91/2267791_DOWNLOAD.pdf. Accessed
26 Jan 2018.
101 Articles 58–64 of the FFP.
102 Article 2(2) of the FFP.
103 Serby (2016). Weatherill, May 2013. The legal ambiguous status
of ‘Financial Fair Play’. Soccernomics. http://www.soccernomics-
agency.com/?p=469. Accessed 26 Jan 2018; Petit (2014) ’Financial
Fair Play’ or ’Oligopoleague’ of Football Clubs?. A Preliminary
Review Under European Union Competition. https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2450719. Accessed 26 Jan 2018.
104 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, art. 45, May 9, 2008, 2012 O.J. (C 326). See C-209/07,
Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd et
Barry Brothers Meat Lt., 20 November 2008, Rec. 2008 p. I-08637, §21.
105 Serby (2016), pp. 44–45.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid, pp. 44–45.
108 Joint Statement by Vice-President Joaquin Almunia and President
Michel Platini, March 2012, para 7. http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
sectors/sports/joint_statement_en.pdf. Accessed 26 Jan 2018 (the
European Commission supported the FFP by issuing a joint statement
of the European Commission and UEFA about the desirability of the
FFP).
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difficulties, football clubs go rarely bankrupt, mainly because
of unauthorized public interventions. In this way, the actions of
the EU Commission are strongly motivated by the systemic
failure to address unlawful State aid in professional football that
makes FIFA’s order rotten from inside.109 From this perspec-
tive, public orders once again left the tough decision—whether
to support regulations that may lead to a cartel based on com-
petition between financially independent clubs or whether to
ignore high risk of unlawful State aid—to the private order.
Second, indirect activities of the reversed civil society
and various football stakeholders have modified the func-
tioning of FFP. This group includes not only the EU
Commission, which actively promoted its State aid policy,
and the CJEU, which has not intervened directly into FFP,
but also others that have challenged FFP in front of
national and European institutions. Consequently, the
application of FFP is not as strict as it could be. Most
importantly, ‘‘the nature and content of the rules has
gradually shifted towards a more liberal approach to
external investment’’.110 For example, a world-record
€222 m spent on the Neymar transfer in 2017 has opened
discussions regarding whether clubs can use loopholes in
the system to circumvent FFP.111 Furthermore, another
mitigating factor is that the break-even rule, does not
strictly apply to certain categories of expenditure such as
infrastructure improvement and youth training.112
The case of FFP shows that public orders once again
refused to intervene directly into the matters of the private
order. FFP is the result of a procedural approach that public
orders increasingly take towards FIFA’s private order by
assisting dialogue among interested stakeholders. The new
procedural approach plays a central role in these interac-
tions and is gradually becoming the main mechanism that
public orders, and predominantly the EU, use to mitigate
disbalances of private ordering.
4.3.3 Social dialogue and the rising procedural approach
The examples of third-party player ownership and FFP
indicate that while the EU does not intervene directly, it
remains actively involved in the process of the inclusion of
the EU policy, predominantly via the EU Commission, into
the football rules. In this context, social dialogue has been
increasingly important instrument. Since Bosman, the
Commission’s focus has shifted from the design of the
rules to the procedure of rule-making.113 Accordingly, this
provides a better chance that football regulations take into
account the interests of all interested actors and that are
better aligned with the fundamental values of democratic
public orders. State-backed efforts to facilitate dialogue
with the aim of promoting inclusive rule-making within a
private order is the softest version of interactions between
public and private orders.
The recent social dialogue in European football, brokered
by the European Commission, illustrates how public orders
can use this procedural mechanism to fulfill their role as
guardians of private orders. The problem arose from repor-
ted widespread practices of abusing player rights in some
Eastern European countries, including cases of imposing
penalties on players equal to their salary or not paying sal-
aries to injured players.114 Such instances suggest that clubs
may have tilted the balance in their favor and football
authorities failed to correct the situation. Although this is a
case justifying public intervention, the European Commis-
sion, instead of intervening directly and regulating sports,
encouraged various stakeholder groups, such as the Euro-
pean Club Association and FIFPro, which represent the
interests of clubs and players, respectively, to engage in a
dialogue with a view to improving the practices of player
protection.115 Both groups had equal representation in the
dialogue. The process resulted in the establishment of the
European Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee in the Pro-
fessional Football Sector and a document listing the mini-
mum requirements in standard players’ contracts in
Europe.116 The European Commissioner for Employment,
Social Affairs and Inclusion was responsible for the social
dialogue and the European Commission promises to assist in
the monitoring and implementation of the Agreement.117
109 Craven (2014).
110 Flanagan (2017) The Evolution of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play
Rules—Part 2: the legal challenges asser international sports law
blog. http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/the-evolution-of-uefa-
s-financial-fair-play-rules-part-2-the-legal-challenges-by-christopher-
flanagan. Accessed 26 Jan 2018.
111 Perchstone and Grayes (2017) UEFA’s financial fair play rules—
why it barks but cannot bite. Monday. http://www.mondaq.com/
Nigeria/x/655756/Sport/UEFAs?Financial?Fair?Play?Rules?
Why?It?Barks?But?Cannot?Bite. Accessed 26 Jan 2018.
112 Joint Statement supra note 108, para 6.
113 Commission of the European Union, White Paper on Sport, COM
(2007) 391 Final, July 2007, pp. 18–19. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0391&from=EN.
Accessed 26 Jan 2018. (introducing the idea of organizing social
dialogue among various stakeholder groups in sports to address the
common concerns of employers and athletes and improve working
conditions in accordance with the EU standards).
114 Colucci and Geeraert (2011), p. 64.
115 Ibid, pp. 60–67.
116 See Agreement Regarding the Minimum Requirements for
Standard Player Contracts in the Professional Football Sector in
European Union and the Rest of the UEFA Territory, April 2012.
http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=7678&langId=en.
Accessed 11 Jan 2018.
117 EU Commission News: new agreement on contract rights for
footballers, April 2012. http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=
89&langId=en&newsId=1279&furtherNews=yes. Accessed 11 Jan
2018.
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Yet, the Agreement, indeed, has not been implemented
very diligently and the effectiveness of the procedure raises
many questions.118 Despite the fact that outcomes of the
social dialogue may not have met expectations, it is, in
principle, the right procedure. By promoting the social
dialogue, the European Commission tried to achieve bal-
ance in the involvement of various interest groups in
football governance and at the same time preserve the
autonomy and self-regulation of football. The European
Commission’s role in the social dialogue was active as far
as the general direction of the rules is concerned. In the
negotiations itself, however, its role was rather passive and
boiled down to the role of a powerful moderator; the
interest groups were the ones that designed the rules.119
This is in stark contrast to the earlier case of designing
transfer rules where interest groups, like FIFPro, although
present, had only minimal input in the design of the rules. It
was the task of the European Commission to negotiate
actively and promote the interests of weaker parties. For
the private order, participation in the social dialogue and
support in implementing the results of this dialogue is the
best way to guarantee its role as a supplier of rules.120 In
other words, while the social dialogue can be improved to
ensure better outcomes, procedure-wise, the dialogue is the
solution.
As a reward, FIFA offers common rules of behavior
spanning across borders that are tailored to the needs of the
involved parties, promote predictable contractual relations,
and create incentives to invest in training young players.121
These advantages would be lost if public interventions
removed FIFA’s order and replace it by a patchwork of
national laws, unstable contractual relations, more costly
dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms, and lim-
ited ability to encourage talent development.122 In contrast,
however, the private order’s refusal to accommodate such
efforts of public orders might undermine the order by
giving incentives to interest groups to advocate for external
state involvement or litigate in state courts, thereby putting
an end to the regulatory monopoly of FIFA’s private order.
The following section illustrates this. Not cleaning the
house even after public interventions such as the FIFA-
gate, may lead to a forceful, but legitimate, public inter-
vention with possibly tragic consequences for the world of
football.
4.4 How rotten private orders invite a reversed
civil society to intervene
While FIFA’s order has many advantages, at some point, it
seemed that FIFA is so powerful that it does not have to
account to anyone.123 Along with the increasing commer-
cial dimension, serious financial integrity weaknesses, as
well as corruption scandals, the incentives of states and
other public orders, particularly the EU, to intervene have
grown.124 For corrupt sport officials, for example, FIFA
has long been a popular place. But some states are getting
tougher on such ruses. The US and Swiss enforcement
authorities, for example, hope that the imposition of strict
anti-corruption laws, often applied to conduct occurring
outside their territorial jurisdiction, will make it easier to
limit the loot of crooked bureaucrats. Furthermore, inten-
sive interactions between FIFA and public orders can also
be seen in the areas of fundamental rights and competi-
tion.125 In this context, both FIFA, by its reluctance to face
some of these problems, and public orders, by overreacting
in certain cases, can contribute to the disintegration of the
entire system.
4.4.1 The FIFA-gate scandal
FIFA-Gate is a major foreign anti-corruption enforcement
scheme. The scheme exemplifies how public orders inter-
vene in private orders when a private order evolves into an
enterprise with elitist structures that extensively tunnel the
private orders’ wealth at the expense of all others. While
FIFA is in principle a non-profit organization, from 2011 to
2014 FIFA generated revenue of $5.718 billion, compared
to $2.2 billion in expenses, mainly as the result of selling
the television and marketing rights to the 2014 World Cup
in Brazil.126 Despite this financial success, however, FIFA
has had serious financial integrity problems including
corruption and bribery related to, for example, the distri-
bution of marketing and broadcasting rights. In the Copa
Ame´rica bribery scheme, one out of many bribery schemes
sanctioned by the US Department of Justice, sport-mar-
keting companies were continuously bribing influential
118 Geeraert (2016) (arguing that hopes for a wider bargaining
agreement in professional football are currently not realistic). See also
Parrish (2016).
119 According to our model, even if the Commission would be more
active in designing the rules, it would still be beneficial than non-
action. This is because such opportunistic behavior within social
dialogue of equal parties cannot destabilize the entire systems of
private orders, to the opposite, overall, these interactions can
strengthen private orders, rather than weaken them.
120 Colucci and Geeraert (2011), p. 67.
121 Duval (2016), pp. 81–116 (discussing public–private nature of
FIFA regulation).
122 See Gomtsian (2017).
123 See generally, Transparency International (2016).
124 Jennings (2011).
125 Among many other see, Serby (2016) (discussing how Financial
Fair Play Regulation and other sporting rules breach the fundamental
freedoms and competition law).
126 FIFA Financial Report 2016 supra note 59.
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football officials to receive official support from these
officials and acquire exclusive partnership contracts related
to the football championship of South America. The brib-
ery payments for each tournament finally reached as high
as $35 million.127 The extent of this bribery scheme, as one
of approximately 15 criminal schemes sanctioned by the
US authorities, is illustrated in Fig. 2 (The original source
is the United States Attorney, the figure was found in
Sargeant P, June 2015. Football Corruption: Who Bought
the Copa America? BBC. http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-latin-america-33087370. Accessed 26 Jan 2018)
below.128
FIFA-Gate illustrates that private associations, along
with promoting the interests of their members, have also
their own interests or the interests of the bureaucrats
administering the functioning of private associations. In the
discussed Copa Ame´rica scheme, individuals involved in
administering a private association were interested in
strengthening bureaucracy to increase their importance—
although legal, this is not always in the interests of other
actors—and used their power to promote their own self-
interest, often in breach of ethical standards and legal rules.
Clearly, powerful inside interest groups disbalanced the
functioning of FIFA’s order and used it to serve their own
interests rather than the interests of football
stakeholders.129
In these settings, despite diplomatic protests of other
countries, such as Russia, that the investigation against
FIFA’s officials is illegal extraterritorial use of US law, the
US authorities structured the entire FIFA enforcement
actions as a broad conspiracy, criminal enterprise, based on
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO).130 The US authorities stated: ‘‘After decades of
[…] brazen corruption, organized soccer needs a new
start—a new chance for its governing institutions to pro-
vide honest oversight and support of a sport […]’’131 Fol-
lowing the US charges in May 2015, FIFA’s new top
bureaucrats tried to use the 2015 charges to their advantage
and started, while portraying themselves as agents of an
Fig. 2 Bribery in the Copa
Ame´rica
127 For more information about the process, see generally Informa-
tion No. 14-cr-609, United States vs. Hawilla, Traffic Sports USA,
INC., and Traffic Sports International, INC.(12 December 2014),
pp. 21–40.
128 For the overview of the criminal schemes see ibid and Supersed-
ing Indictment No. 15-cr-252, United States vs. Hawit et al., No.
15-cr-252 (25 November 2015).
129 See the discussion about elitists groups in Sect. 3.1 above.
130 Section 901(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Public Law No. 91–452, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968; Foreign Policy,
May 2015. Russia: US FIFA Investigation is Illegal Extraterritorial
Use of Law. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/27/russia-u-s-fifa-inves
tigation-is-illegal-extraterritorial-use-of-law-world-cup-2018-sepp-
blatter-putin/. Accessed 26 Jan 2018.
131 United States Department of Justice, May 2015. Nine FIFA
Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted for Racketeering
Conspiracy and Corruption. Press Release. https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-executives-indicted-rack
eteering-conspiracy-and. Accessed 26 Jan 2018.
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integrity reform, engaging in similar activities as their
predecessors.132 Only 6 months later, sixteen additional
FIFA officials, some of them the highest FIFA officials that
replaced the old leadership, were charged with a 92-count
‘‘superseding indictment’’ that was even bigger than the
original indictment.133
4.4.2 The effect of FIFA-gate
Global application of US criminal legislation illustrates how
private orders with elitist structures face external pressure to
improve their governance. The illustrated practice of states,
though controversial in many respects, has been a crucial
element in ensuring that one of the groups within FIFA’s
order is not tilting the balance too much in its own favor. This
is exactly the case when the state can help to strengthen
private orders. By reigning too powerful actors, public orders
can contribute to the success of a private order. Otherwise, a
private order might turn into an association that promotes the
interests of only one group, at the expense of all others, losing
broad support and transferring value from one to another
group instead of creating economic value.
In the discussed case, not only many of the highest FIFA
officials resigned their functions, but also pleaded guilty to
number criminal offenses.134 Following the extraordinary
FIFA congress that adopted landmark reforms in February
2016, FIFA implemented governance reforms. Be it the
separation of strategic functions from executive functions,
stronger control of money flows, or enhanced transparency,
FIFA has been given a chance to become less of a rotten
order than it used to be before the US criminal enforcement
actions.135 The allegations brought by the US and other
authorities against FIFA officials and marketing corpora-
tions can help FIFA to clean its house and prevent greater
interventions that may undermine the existence of FIFA’s
order and remove its advantages.136
However, a private association may reach a stage when
there is no way back. If norms of private ordering become
so corrupt that a positive change is hardly possible, direct
public intervention is desirable. After the recent neutral-
ization of FIFA’s internal corruption investigations, more
radical ‘‘public nudge’’ may be needed to wake up FIFA
before it is too late. The reluctance of FIFA to improve its
governance may invite the reverse civil society to impose
‘‘certain basic ‘constitutional’ requirements’’.137 There is,
however, a very thin line between such constitutional
requirements and other interventions that may remove the
advantages if FIFA’s order.
5 Conclusion
The evidence of private institutions that, relatively inde-
pendently, support order under the ever-present influence
of public orders indicates that the division between
‘‘purely’’ public and ‘‘purely’’ private modes of governance
is a well-conceptualized illusion. This illusion poses the
risk in that sticking too much to the traditional public–
private divide could develop doubts about the ability of
researchers to say something useful as far as the emergence
and evolution of good order is concerned. Maybe surpris-
ingly, this concern unites both the legal-centric scholars
and fans of economic governance research programs. Both
camps are too radical in their belief of who should be in
charge of establishing a good order: ‘‘some scholars want
to see self-regulation and privatization everywhere, while
others simply want to see the State still being in control,
and both are somehow right’’.138
The success of modern private orders, including FIFA,
is closely associated with the constraints provided by
public orders. To grasp the nature of these constraints we
considered the role of the state to be similar to a democratic
process in which the civil society influences public deci-
sion-making. Public orders may protect private orders, in
the same way that civil society protects states, from the
capture of such private orders by inside interest groups. In
this context, FIFA exemplifies two main roles that public
orders play in the evolution of successful private orders. In
their first role, public orders authoritatively change, limit,
or even prohibit certain functions of private orders. Com-
mon rules spanning across borders, predictable contractual
relations, and incentives to invest in training young players,
132 Paragraph 136 et seq. of the Superseding Indictment supra note
128.
133 Ibid.
134 Defendants in the original indictment were citizens of ten
different countries.
135 FIFA, October 2016. FIFA 2.0: The Vision for the Future. http://
resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/bodies/02/86/83/93/one
year_extraordinarycongress_neutral_neutral.pdf. Accessed 26 Jan
2018.
136 This logic applies not only to corruption but also to many other
aspects of FIFA’s order. Consider, for example, the discussion on
procedural fairness and transparency related to the CAS dispute
resolution mechanism. The fact that CAS has problems does not mean
that the mechanisms, or its leading features, should be abolished.
Similarly, FIFA’s governance problems do not imply that FIFA’s
order is in its essence undesirable.
137 Similarly also Weatherill (2017), pp. 245–287 (arguing that
increasing concern to consider the claim that sport is special not just
in the context of substance but also in terms of the specificity of
governance choices of sport governing bodies); Duval A, May 2017.
The reform of FIFA: plus c¸a change, moins c¸a change? Asser
International Sports Law Blog. http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/
post/the-reform-of-fifa-plus-ca-change-moins-ca-change. Accessed
26 Jan 2018.
138 Calliess and Zumbansen (2010), p. 113.
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are only some advantages that convinced public orders to
allow FIFA to develop its tailored rules of behavior. These
advantages would not be utilized without public orders
granting regulatory privileges to FIFA, or would be lost if
public interventions removed FIFA’s order and replace it
by a patchwork of national laws, unstable contractual
relations, more costly dispute resolution and enforcement
mechanisms, and limited ability to encourage talent
development.
In their second role, public orders act alongside private
orders. For example, when co-determining the substance of
institutions in a regulatory space that states share with
private orders. FIFA exemplifies that the public–private
interactions direct the evolution of private orders by setting
a starting benchmark of freedom, but then stepping back
and letting private ordering function within such bench-
mark. In some cases, a public order acts as an equal partner
and protects private orders, in the same way as civil society
protects states, from the capture of such private orders by
inside interest groups. From this perspective, FIFA is a
success story of public–private interaction.
The fact that FIFA is predominantly constrained by
reversed civil society, i.e., the state, increases FIFA’s
responsibility towards the public. The public is in a posi-
tion to blame FIFA, rather than blame the state, for
ignoring the problem of negative externalities and weak
governance. If FIFA cannot address some of these prob-
lems sufficiently, it is inviting the state to return in its
authoritative role, thereby undermining FIFA’s own
authority. The primary reason for potential state interven-
tion, however, is the private order rules, but internal
imbalances that undermine the legitimacy of its con-
stituency. These imbalances may also corrupt the norms of
the private order. The strongest form of reversed civil
society’s intervention to restore the lost balance is to strike
against the corrupt constituency. For the time being, FIFA-
gate represents a moderate strike by reversed civil society.
Nevertheless, a moderate strike that does not lead to
improvements can easily evolve into a revolution.
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